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This report is based on the paper "Small Satellites- A
Disruptive Technology", Feb. 16, 2006 written by John
Delaney, Bryan Lee, Terry Rector and John Stuart for
Professor Christine Shea at the University of New
Hampshire as an assignment for the Masters of
Technology Management program. The subject of that
paper was specifically selected and prepared as the
background information for this topical presentation to
the 2006 Small Satellite Conference, Aug. 14-17,2006 at
Utah State University, Logan, UT. The adaptation of that
paper for this report and presentation is done so with the
permission of the authors.
In the mid 1980's, a new satellite design methodology
emerged the low cost, potentially high risk designs of
the "Small Satellite Revolution." Instead of developing
satellites weighing thousands of kilograms and costing
hundreds of millions of dollars, engineering teams of
only a handful of people began designing mini-satellites
weighing 500 kg or less and costing only a couple
million dollars.

-

Table 1. Satellite Size Defmition
Group Name

Wet Mass

Large satellite
Medium sized satellite

> 1000kg
500-1000h
100500k

Mini satellite
Micro satellite

10100k

lNano satellite

110k

Pico satellite

0.1Ik

Femto satellite

<100

Large, high value satellites are the leading technology
solution available to meet user's needs. As basic
technology has evolved, medium class satellites are
beginning to find their niche roles. The next phase of
technological advancement is upon us as the small
satellites begin to evolve and find their place within the
user communities.
Modem micro and mini satellites are designed and built
with a different philosophy than that used for
conventional satellites. The focus is on low cost,
flexibility, reconfiguration and rapid response that are
capabilities-driven and not requirements-driven. The
primary reason for what makes these instruments so
inexpensive compared to the conventional satellites is the
rapid development cycle enabled by the use of
Commercial-off-the-she1f (COTS) hardware.
The
typical "order to orbif' time for these satellites is 24-36
months. The comparable time for a large satellite
program is 8-10 years!
Most small satellites further reduce costs by employing
single string designs in which subsystems lack
redundancy. Critics of this approach say the risk of
leaving the spacecraft susceptible to single-point failures
is too high. Small satellites also carry fewer instruments
than their larger counterparts. The proponents of this
methodology assert that launching multiple small, less
capable, low cost satellites to perform a mission will in
the long run prove cheaper than launching a few large,
highly capable, overly redundant, very high cost satellites
(deSilval,2006).

Small
Satellites

Our thesis is that these smaller satellites are now being
poised to play an important part in the space industry.
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The primary difference in the predicted reliability is
driven by redundancies on the larger platforms. These
satellites are designed with 3 levels of duplicate
equipment. This adds significantly to the complexity,
control, and cost of the instrument. Conversely, there are
very few redundancies in a small satellite system. The
mission plan is that the platform will undergo graceful
degradation and need to be replaced within 3-5 years. At
that time the advancements in technology will be
significant. allowing additional missions to be
performed. This concept takes full advantage of
improvements in technology and the reduced costs
associated with it. A small satellite constellation may
last only a few years but the ability to rapidly develop
and deploy a replacement is what makes the business so
attractive.

Marketplace Penetration

According to Smith, 2005; "The majority of US medium
to large companies (revenue greater than $50M) have not
embraced the small satellite concept. There is large
disagreement relative to the viability of such a business
given the high cost oflaunching satellites."
One major small satellite supplier has succeeded because
they have an aggressive fixed price business model
which controls requirements. They also have established
university relationships which allows for intellectual
property (IP) sharing at zero or minimal investment.
These relationships also serve to develop the future
workforce and possibly supplement the operation with
inexpensive student labor. Large companies may find
this model difficult to imitate. With very few
documented small satellite opportunities, some of the
domestic small satellite producer incumbents actually
seem to be migrating toward larger bus opportunities.
An additional factor to consider is that the size of future
market may be directly dependent on the availability of a
low cost launch vehicle (SpaceX Falcon success).
(deSilvaJ,2006).

The argument of reliability is coming under scrutiny as
more and more COTS items are shown to perform well
in orbit. The relationships between parts quality,
subsystem redundancy and environmental stress
screening are being examined in terms of cost
effectiveness. A small satellite's reliability can often be
improved by having its subsystems perform multiple
tasks. This can sometimes compensate for reduced
levels of redundancy. That is to say, small satellites have
fewer parts but those parts provide multiple functions
compared to large satellites having multiple single
function payloads. In general, having fewer parts drives
higher reliability at lower cost. This will be a key factor
in the future since the reduced complexity offered will
offset the cost of larger numbers of satellites.

Small Satellites - Disruptive or Not?

The disruptive nature of the small satellite concept is
evaluated against the five aspects identified in
Christensen's thesis. Each is analyzed in support of our
position that we are indeed dealing with a potentially
disruptive product that will revolutionize the
marketplace. Three additional concepts :&om other
sources are also introduced that help support our theses.
These are the time-technology curve that has been
demonstrated in the electronics industry. It is similar to
Moore's law relative to micro-processors and may
actuaIIybe the enabling factor. The second is the whole
miniaturization effect that is happening simuItaneously
with reliability improvements.

Another prime consideration is the use of readily
available technology. The role of COTS (commercial off
the shelf) items in the small satellite industry is dramatic.
Several successful missions have been completed using
readily available technology. This serves to actually
enhance performance in terms of microprocessors and
memory devices. Taking advantage of this leads to a
system that has significantly more processing capability
than the heritage approach. As a result of this timetechnology relationship, these small satellites can
actually have greater processing capability than the
alternative larger platforms (Smith, 2005).

Lastly, improvements in complementary assets, in this
case small launch vehicles, will further enhance the
attractiveness of a small satellite constellation approach.
All factors serve to create a compelling case for the small
satellite business model (Christensen, 1999).

Another factor to be considered here is the survivability
trades that will need to be undertaken to find the
appropriate level of redundancy and lor hardening
requjred to evolve the small sat experience at LEO into
the MEO and GEO environments.

1. A disruptive technology initially underperforms the
dominant design.
No doubt this is the case in comparing small satellites to
the legacy system designs and applications. By shear
volume, a small satellite is unable to perform all the
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functions the larger pJatfonn is capable of doing.
However, over time it is anticipated that ever evolving
technology as well as satellite constellation, (comprised
of multiple small satellites), will be comparable and
eventually outperfonn existing products. An approach
that has several small nodes rather than one massive
multi-function platfonn is a primary tenant for small
satellite deployment. It's this architecture that.will serve
as an enabler for the small satellite to be disruptive to the
cmrent satellite market. In addition, the launch system
needed to deploy such a system is a complementary asset
and has similar potential. It underperfonns the existing
launch platfonns; in fact, it is basically unproven as a
reliable delivery mechanism. Another aspect to the
potentially disrupting nature of small satellites is the
disagreement on the use of COTS for space applications.
Early indications are that industrial grade COTS
components perfonn well in space. This is a risk some
customers are willing to take and so far have been
rewarded with low cost, state-of-the-art computing and
added functionality (Gallagher, 2006. Schilling, 2005).
Whether this success can be applied into MEO and GEO
applications remains an issue for healthy debate.

Source: Included within Figure
2. Products based on a disruptive technology are
generally cheaper, simpler, smaller and more convenient.
The general consensus is that the small satellite is an
order of magnitude lower in cost than existing large
satellites. "Faster, better, cheaper" has been a desire
coming :trom the customer base since the late 1980's.
The makers of these devices have capitalized on that by
developing their own slogan "80% perfonnance for 20%
of the cost, and 40% of schedule". As stated previously,
what drives lower cost is the rapid development time in
comparison to large satellites. In order to do so a
different operating strategy, one that has a much higher
tolerance for risk, has been employed. The use of
prescreened COTS hardware and components is an
approved practice. This has a dramatic affect on lead
times because engineers are focused on applications
rather than core designs (Bearden, 2006).
COTS playa huge role in the convenience factor of a
small satellite, in particular the operating system.
Programmers are able to use or reuse software developed
for other applications and rapidly port it to the platfonn.
Costly development tasks are minimi7.edand the lengthy
prove-in cycle is minimi7.ed. Risk is reduced since the
code has already been proven for a similar terrestrial
application. The hardware utilized is of similar pedigree.
Industrial-grade products that have proven themselves
are selected. Lead time for these products is weeks
rather than months. Many of the engineers are already
familiar with their configuration and require minimal
training on the application (deSilva3, 1995).

As shown in Figure 1below; small satellite technology is
represented by the red arrow while the green atTOWis
planned technological growth for the cmrent satellites
systems. The blue arrow represents customer demands.
With continued success, small satellites will quickly
grow and overcome customer demands. As this occurs,
the product line will continue to build momentum and
advocacy and increase in popularity. Customers will be
intrigued by the product's lower cost while providing
reasonable capability quickly, speeding up the return on
investment. Eventually, small satellites production,
launch and operations will surpass that of large satellites
requiring the large satellite industry to reposition itself as
the market becomes more attractive (Christensen, 1999).

Assessing

Disruptive

Perhaps the number one factor is the customers'
willingness to accept potentially reduced perfonnance.
The bias to "over-engineer" is very common practice.
No engineer wants to develop a product that fails to
perfonn. Therefore safety factors of 2 or 3 are typically
applied to initial design parameters. In the end the
product's complexity may be such that the reliability and
perfonnance is actually less than if these factors were not
applied. Utilizing COTS eliminates this possibility and
greatly contributes to the order of magnitude difference
in cost between a large satellite and a small one.

Technologies

3. The leading customers generally do not want and
initially can not use products based on a disruptive
technology.
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deSilva states; "The incumbents have dismissed small
satellites because they do not fit their decade's old,
existing business model. They have concluded that
investing in this technology is not a rational financial

NewYor'"

Figure 1. Assessing Disruptive Technologies
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decision for them. The reason for this is that they have
built an infrastructure quite smrilar to that of the US steel
industry in the mid 80's. Their inherent "largeness"
makes it very difficult to embrace or consider any other
concept, including small satellites. Strikingly smrilar
market and technology conditions existed with the initial
mini-mills. Initial capabilities were lmrited but enhanced
rapidly as the demand for certain products enticed the
small processors to invest in new technology. It's
generally a foregone conclusion that the US "rust belf'
will never fully recover ftom this short slightness
"(deSilva3,2006).

time, it appears highly likely that small systems will be
more reliable and cheaper.
Even if one does not consider small sats to be "disruptive
technology", it is hard to argue against their status as an
innovation whose use is increasing over time. There is
well documented evidence (Rogers, 1962) that describes
the rate of adoption of new technology or "d.iffusionof
innovations" (see Figure 3).

Cumulative Penetration

or Sales

While we understand this viewpoint, it is important to
appreciate that domestic Government needs ARE being
met by the existing space assets. The common wisdom
will always reflect that change is initially met by
resistance with a very gradual shift to acceptance. The
key points to understand here is that change costs money
and induces risk. These are two critical and valid factors
that will not be easily set aside.
Another indication that the technology may be disruptive
is the general lack of agreement in the industry regarding
the viability of small satellites. There are several well
respected individuals on both sides of the ledger. Some
premier scientists have left their positions in the large
satellite producers to start or work in companies
developing small satellites.
At the moment the
marketing data are inconclusive. None of these small
satellite providers are making significantprofits however
this may be due to the lack of launch opportunities not
the lack of demand for their products.

Time
Figure 3. Technology Adoption Curve
The latest generation of Small Sats represent yet another
new technology following the well established
technology adoption/diffusion s-curve (Figure 3) across
the space community. As Rogers indicates, we can
expect that the users of this technology can be roughly
grouped into the following categories based on when
they take advantage of the new technology: innovators
(2.5%) early adopters (13.5%), early majority (34%), late
majority (34%), and laggards (16%).

The Government's most successful attempt at
''normalizing'' small satellites for mission specific
applications have been analyzed and reported on in a
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report entitled
"Space Acquisition- DoD Needs a Department wide
Strategy for Pursuing Low-Cost, Responsive Tactical
Space Capabilities" issued in March of this year. The
report cites the TacSat series of satellites as a
commendable attempt to take advantage of the
capabilities now offered by smaller satellites. The
challenge of the future is to continue the success with
follow-on TacSat missions.

In the authors' opinion, small sat technology has
progressed ftom the innovator stage to the early adopter
stage. Significant cost savings benefits have accrued to
these early users of small sat technology. The question of
interest is:
Who will form the next wave of adopters, the early
majority and who will be late (or laggards) in gaining the
benefits of this new technology?

4. The disruptive technology steadily improves
performance until it meets the standards deemed
necessary by the market.

It is the authors' opinion that that there will always be a
place for the large, high value satellite and medium
satellite solutionjust as there is a place for the large, high
value main ftame and mini-computer today. However,
just as the small, technologically advanced, networked
PC has evolved to become a dominant computing

It is our belief that the small satellite business will be on
a steep trajectory relative to capability and functionalitY.
As the reliability of electronic devices improves with
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solution over time, we anticipate that the small,
technologically advanced, networked satellite will
become a dominant solution for users' needs in space.

technology has improved,medium satellites have found a
place in meeting users needs. As technology continued
to improve fin1her, the small satellite solution became
possible. Early small satellites offer advantages in cost,
and delivery time, but do not equal the performance of
the existing large, high value satellites in all respects.

It is interesting to examine the shift in the computer
market ftom large main ftame solutions to minicomputers and then small personal computers in a little
more detail and compare it to the satellite market trends.

It is the authors' opinion that it is only a matter of time
until we see a solution similar to the PC in space. Small,
powerful, inexpensive, networked, satellite constellations
will become the dominant solution over large, expensive,
multi-mission individual satellites.

The large main ftames were the only solution to meet the
market needs in the beginning. Each was customized,
few ofIthe shelf parts existed and costs were high.
As the technology matured, traditional suppliers of
mainftame computers eventually offered smaller minicomputer solutions.

As demonstrated in other high-tech industries, this
technology will continue to evolve rapidly, at a much
greater pace than that of large satellites. Sensor
technology has made great advances in miniaturization
and will continue to do so as Field-Programmable Gate
Arrays (FPGA) gain more capabilities, while reducing in
size and power requirements.
Power generation
capabilities are also increasing, allowing smaller
spacecraft to carry more power demanding payloads,
providing more capability. The majority of all satellites
use solar photovoltaic arrays, also known as solar panels,
to convert sunlight into electricity. These devices
continue to provide an improving power conversion
efficiencyper square centimeter and today are yielding in
the area of25% more power than 10 years ago (Bearden,
1984).

With continued advances in technology, PCs became
possible. Compared to main ftame solutions, PCs were
much less expensive, could be purchased "off the shelf',
but with reduced performance compared to the main
ftames. However, the reduced performance was adequate
for many needs. The reduced price rapidly expanded the
user community for computers. The larger market in turn
drove innovations, many of which could not be
anticipated
The continued advance of technology enables more
powerful PCs, accompanied by networking technology
and multi-processor solutions which eventually
surpassed the capability of earlier mainftame solutions.
Within two decades, high end PCs achieved
"supercomputer" performance levels and were restricted
ftom export. Parts became "plug and play", prices
dropped an order of magnitude for comparable
capability. Analog hardware became digital hardware.
Digital hardware became software. The internet
blossomed as a companion technology solution, and
enabled the networking ofPCs around the planet.

Lastly, through development and better application, the
attitude control system, also known as the ACS, is
providing a great deal more pointing accuracy and
knowledge.
These advancements allow for more
autonomy of operation and better fidelity and radiometric
capabilities in data. The greater autonomy allows less
manpower to maintain / operate many more satellites
while the better fidelity and radiometric data has opened
additionalmarkets for small satellites.

In retrospect, the following observations can be made:

These continued improvements have and will create new
markets, motivating new customers to use small satellites
to satisfy their space application needs, all continuing to
boost this disruptive technology.

-Today's total computer market dwarfs the early
mainftame market.
-There is still a market for mainftame solutions,but it is a
small ftaction of the total computing market

5. The new technology displaces the dominant one and
the new entrant displaces the incumbent

-small, inexpensive, powerful, networked processors are
a dominant solution in the computing domain.

The small satellite has the potential to be a truly
disruptive technology. It currently exhibits several of the
characteristicsthat would classify it as disruptive.

It is the author's opinion that a parallel phenomena exists
with satellites. In the beginning, there were few
technology solutions available and large, high value
satellites were an excellent solution for users needs. As
5
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satellites in 3 orbits and is anticipated to cost only
$200M USD (deSilva2, 1995)
6. Other considerations
Once the challenges of the scientific, technical, business
and data user communities are met, the procurement
process will have to be addressed. Success in some
small satellite programs has been dependant upon
building a vehicle to a set of mature requirements with
few or no "TBDs". The procurement process should
focus on reducing or eliminating the unknowns in the
contracts prior to award and then enforcing a strict policy
to eliminate any scope creep. This may be an easier
policy to enforce with small satellites since their
development period will be shorter and their missions
will be more focused than larger vehicles. Changes in
requirements can more easily be met by developing a
new block change model of a satellite without perturbing
the vehicle in development It may be cheaper to build
and launch sequential satellites rather than delay
development as new requirements are added. With a
procurement process such as this, the development costs
and risk would be significantly reduced which may
encourage more fixed price contracts. This model would
be a success for both the buyer and the seller.

....
......

~

GlOVE-A, Europe's first Gameo navigation satellite
Large satellites systems are already experiencing
displacement as current space applications are migrating
to small satellite platforms.
On January 9th, a 600Kg small satellite completed initial
operating certification and turned over to the European
Space Agency, called GlOVE-A, Europe's first Galileo
navigation satellite.

7. Conclusions
Small satellites are the way for the future. They support
nearly all space applications already and are gaining in
popularity due to cost, shorter development time, less
pound per requirement, and ease of operation. Small
satellites, as with many other high tech electronics, are
continually improving. Their small size allow for more
missions within the same, ever shrinking NASA and
DOD budgets.
Lastly, small satellites make
constellations a viable option. In the past all satellites
were custom designed for each individual mission,
making them very expensive, requiring many years to
build, and if defective were a total loss. Small satellites
are changing that trend by creating economically
modular designs that can easily grow to satisfy mission
requirements and can be quickly replaced or augmented.
Along with this modular concept and evolving sensor
designs, a new found flexibility has entered into the
satellite arena and will become the dominate design in
short order. Large satellites will never be replaced but
could be augmented or "streamlined" by the
incorporation of small sats into the larger mission
scheme thereby reducing complexity, cost and lead time
to launch. The next order of business must be the
successful development of a dependable, low cost (under
$lOM) launch vehicle for smaller payload missions
which will only serve to accellerate the trend to smaller

Global Position System (GPS) Block DR satellite
This satellite weights nearly a third as much as the
United States Global Position System (GPS) Block IIR
satellite (2,032Kg) and cost half as much, €28M euros
(~$50M USD) as compared to $114M USD for the GPS
satellite.
Additionally, GPS currently cost the United States Air
Force $750M USD annually to operate their 28 satellites,
while GlOVE-A is the first of the planned ESA 30
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satellites. Finally, the U.S. industrial base will make the
necessary adjustments and commitments to this model,
in partnership with the government.
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